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I. INTRODUCTION
The premise of this Comment is a tired platitude: that today in-
formation is, and in the future will only increasingly be, exchanged
primarily on the Internet. From this boring and uncontroversial as-
sumption, this Comment argues that the unenumerated constitu-
tional right of access to courts entails that prisons provide pro se pris-
oner litigants with Internet access to help them with legal research.
Establishing such a right need not lead to inmates surfing the web
all day, trading pornography, and e-mailing death threats to the At-
torney General. Simple, inexpensive, and practically foolproof tech-
nology exists' that can limit a computer's Internet access to only pre-
approved law-related websites. Reasonable, or even draconian, re-
strictions could still be put in place to suit security needs.
Nor need this right put an unfunded mandate on state justice sys-
tems to subscribe to million dollar research systems.! Quality legal re-
search resources are available today online for free-and they can
only be expected to get better with time. These resources include
private services like Findlaw.com and Wikipedia, as well as govern-
ment websites that states already pay for anyway.
States would have to pay for computers, Internet access, filters,
and maintenance-all of which are generally falling in price every
year. But over the long run, states would eventually save money, be-
cause the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Bounds v. Smiths already
* J.D. candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008; B.A., University of Michigan,
2004.
1 See infra Part II.E.
2 A 2006 survey calculated that private law firms paid, on average, $999,825 for LexisNexis
and $1,494,588 for Westlaw in 2005. These figures were up from $856,731 and
$1,241,337, respectively, in 2004. Alan Cohen, Law Librarians Look Beyond Books, AM.
LAWYERJuly 11, 2006, at 65.
3 430 U.S. 817 (1977); see infra Part II.C.
JOURNAL OF CONSTFTFIONAL LA W
obligates them to provide pro se inmates with access to paper law li-
braries that require regular, expensive updates.4
As a matter of political philosophy, moreover, this right is compel-
ling. Our nation is constitutionally committed to fundamental fair-
ness in its criminal justice system, and extending Internet access to
inmates for this purpose would advance that promise tremendously.
Fairness, of course, is a noble end in itself; in consequentialist terms,
the more just our criminal justice system appears to the public, the
more we can expect the citizenry to follow its commands. But per-
haps most valuably, encouraging criminals to do legal research on the
Internet appeals to the seemingly forgotten rehabilitative philosophy
of criminal punishment in that it presents a golden opportunity for
imparting computer literacy skills6 and the civilizing effects of legal
understanding' on those members of our society most in need of
both. Although the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 68% of
state prison inmates have never received a high school diploma" and
authoritative studies have demonstrated that prison education pro-
grams reduce recidivism," the latest data show that the national per-
centage of inmates participating in education courses is falling. °
4 The Court's subsequent decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), which effectively
reduced the scope of the States' obligations to furnish prison law libraries, saved Wash-
ington State $1.2 million per year and Arizona $650,000. See infra Part II.C. Accord
Cohen, supra note 2, at 65 (interviewing law firm librarian who "discovered that it was
more cost-effective to buy a new copy of American Jurisprudence II every other year, get-
ting the new-subscriber discount, than to pay for annual updates").
5 See generally Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453
(1997).
6 See, e.g., James L. Esposito, Comment, Virtual Freedom-Physical Confinement: An Analysis of
Prisoner Use of the Internet, 26 NEw ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 39, 64-65 (2000)
(describing North Carolina and Minnesota programs that have used the Internet in pris-
ons for rehabilitation); see also infra Part II.C.
7 The Bounds Court cited a 1974 survey of prison officials that found "over 80% felt legal
services provide a safety valve for inmate grievances, reduce inmate power structures and
tensions from unresolved legal problems, and contribute to rehabilitation by providing a
positive experience with the legal system." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 829-30 n.18.
8 CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, EDUCATION
AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), http://ww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ecp.
pdf.
9 See, e.g., MILES D. HARER, PRISON EDUCATION PARTICIPATION AND RECIDIVISM: A TEST OF
THE NORMALIZATION HYPOTHESIS 16 (1995), http://www.bop.gov/news/research_
projects/published_reports/recidiism/orepredprg.pdf ("[There is] substantial evidence
that prison education program participation reduces the likelihood of recidivating irre-
spective of post-release employment. [The author] interpret[s] this result as support for
the normalization hypothesis, which posits that many policies, operations, and programs
found in modem prisons reduce prisonization and nurture prosocial norms supporting
rule/law abiding behavior .... Additional analysis suggests that the monetary savings
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In the real world, however, the democratic process denies prison-
ers access to the free law-related websites available online. Few states
even allow inmates to use DVD-based legal research tools" let alone
surf the web. Congress seems unlikely to step in to aid prisoners, ei-
ther. In 1998, a bill was introduced that would have banned all fed-
eral, and many state, inmates from using the Internet at all.' 2 More
recently, a sitting House Majority Leader voiced contempt for web-
based legal research in general, even that done at the Supreme
Court. 13
In short, the prospects of achieving this reform through legisla-
tion appear dim. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently
found the Constitution to guarantee a right to meaningful access to
courts, even (in fact, especially) for prisoners.14 Therefore, in an age
in which dockets can be accessed and fruitful legal research can be
done, for free, on any Internet-connected computer, advocacy for an
extension of that right to include a guarantee of the freedom to ac-
cess online legal resources might prove more productive than idly
waiting for legislatures to come around.
from reduced recidivism, due to prison education program participation, are substan-
tial.").
10 See HARLOW, supra note 8, at I ("[T]he percentage of State prison inmates who reported
taking education courses while confined fell from 57% in 1991 to 52% in 1997 ....").
11 These states include Louisiana, Wisconsin, Georgia, California, Steve Seidenberg, Replac-
ing Lawyers with DVDs, 3 A.B.A.J. E-REPORT 1,Jan. 9, 2004, and Pennsylvania, Letter from
James C. Young, inmate, to author (Oct. 15, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing life as
a prison lawyer: "[W]e have updated and current material either in book form or via
computer. We have an intranet, if you will. A closed loop system which accesses a server.
Premise 4.0 is used for legal research and Dunlap Hanna for forms."). But see Clark v.
Johnson, 181 F. App'x. 606, 607 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1133 (2007) (find-
ing that CD-ROMs with federal court opinions had been removed from the Wisconsin Re-
source Center law library and that this "appears likely to invite serious constitutional
claims in the firture").
12 See Stop Trafficking of Pornography in Prisons Act (STOPP ACT) of 1998, H.R. 3729,
105th Cong. § 2 (1998) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no agency, officer,
or employee of the United States shall implement, or provide any financial assistance to,
any Federal program or Federal activity in which a Federal prisoner is allowed access to
any interactive computer service without the supervision of an official of the Govern-
ment.").
13 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 198
(2007) ("Every year, one or two justices testified before Congress in support of the
Court's annual budget request, and Kennedy often took on the assignment. In his testi-
mony.., he mentioned in passing that he used the Internet for legal research. This
prompted Tom DeLay, the[n] House majority leader, to tell an interviewer from Fox
News Radio, 'We've gotJustice Kennedy... [who] said in session that he does his own re-
search on the Internet. That is just incredibly outrageous.'").
14 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 ("[T]he prisoner petitions here are the first line of
defense against constitutional violations.").
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One challenge to this approach is that even Justice Stevens-the
sitting Justice most receptive to extending prisoner rights'5-has ex-
pressly noted in dictum that "a prisoner would lose on the merits if
he alleged that the deprivation of that right [of effective access to the
courts] occurred because the State, for example, did not provide him
with access to on-line computer databases .... However, that foot-
note is now more than a decade old, and as this Comment argues, the
subsequent Internet Revolution represents such a paradigm shift in
the way we access information that it now requires the states and the
federal government to do now precisely what Justice Stevens said they
were not required to do in 1996.
The greatest challenge to this Comment is not Stevens's Lewis dic-
tum, however, but rather the aversion of today's conservative Justices
to the methods of constitutional interpretation that gave rise to the
non-textual right of meaningful access to courts in the first place. 7
Rather than attempting to make sense of the jurisprudence in any de-
tail, it suffices to quote Justice Souter's most recent try: "Decisions of
this Court have grounded the right of access to courts in the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, 8 the First Amendment Petition
15 See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine) (con-
necting Stevens's sympathy for criminal defendants to his experience at age fourteen of
seeing his father, uncle, and grandfather wrongfully indicted for embezzlement, leading
to his uncle's suicide and the "unjust," later overturned, conviction of his father). See also
People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154 (Ill. 1934) (casting doubt on the evidence and reversing
the conviction against the future Justice's father).
16 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 408 n.5 (1996) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
17 Compare M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) ("We observe first that the Court's deci-
sions concerning access to judicial processes . . . reflect both equal protection and due
process concerns. . . . [D]ue process and equal protection principles converge. The
equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants
based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The due process concern homes in on
the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action. A
precise rationale has not been composed, because cases of this order cannot be resolved
by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis." (citations and quotation marks omit-
ted)), with Lewis, 518 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have described the right
articulated in Bounds as a 'consequence' of due process, as an 'aspect' of equal protec-
tion, or as an 'equal protection guarantee.' In no instance, however, have we engaged in
rigorous constitutional analysis of the basis for the asserted right." (citations omitted)).
But cf id. at 381 ("In the end, I agree that the Constitution affords prisoners what can be
termed a right of access to the courts. That right, rooted in the Due Process Clause and
the principle articulated in Ex parte Hull, is a right not to be arbitrarily prevented from
lodging a claimed violation of a federal right in a federal court.").
18 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (citing Chambers v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873)).
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Clause,' 9 the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,20 and the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection
2' and Due Process Clauses.,
22
Because conservative concerns about such nebulous constitutional in-
terpretation are valid and likely to grow in influence in the future,
this Comment strives wherever possible to address the arguments of
Justices Scalia and Thomas on their own terms.
Thus, Part III of this Comment ultimately attempts to root the pro
se prisoner's right to legal research more firmly in the text of the
Constitution, in the hope that a greater appreciation for the correct-
ness of Bounds will help carry the right forward into the third mille-
nium.
First, a short history of legal research inside and outside of prisons
is due. Part II shows that the venerable tradition of legal research in
this country is deeply rooted in the traditions of our Nation. It then
describes the rise and fall of the right to legal research in prisons. It
ends with a word on the technological revolution that has swept the
planet since the Court's most recent decision.
II. HISTORY
A. Legal Research in the Early Republic
The origins of modern-day legal research date to the earliest days
of the Republic. Ephraim Kirby published the first reporter from any
jurisdiction, a collection of decisions from the State of Connecticut,
in 1789, just one year after the Constitution was ratified.2 Alexander
Dallas published the second, covering Pennsylvania law, in 1790.4
The second volume of Dallas's reporter also featured cases from the
freshly constituted Supreme Court of the United States, which was
meeting in Philadelphia at the time; the decisions of the Supreme
Court have been formally recorded for posterity and public use since.
The Supreme Court's second reporter, William Cranch, envisioned
his labors as an essential check on the discretion of undemocratically
19 Id. (citing Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Cal. Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)).
20 Id. (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion); Walters v.
Nat'l Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985)).
21 Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)).
22 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971)).
23 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 242 (3d ed. 2005).
24 Id. Significantly, this latter reporter, Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Courts of
Pennsylvania, Before and Since the Revolution, covered cases as far back as 1754.
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appointed judges. "Whatever tends to render the laws certain," he
opined, "equally tends to limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing
conduces more to that object than the publication of reports.,,15 By
1800, reporters were published for Vermont and Virginia. New York,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey had their first reporters by 1810.
26
Rhode Island, the last state to see its decisions reported, held out un-
til 1847.7
It is significant for the purposes of this Comment that the early
Republic also abounded in legal self-help texts designed for laymen.
"Every Man His Own Lawyer!," an ideal the utilitarian philosopher Jer-
emy Bentham exhorted in an open letter to the American people, 8
soon became, in the words of one historian, a "ubiquitous title ' '29 for
simple law texts in plain English. One book so entitled, published in
New York in 1768 and in Philadelphia in 1769, ° even predates the
Constitution. The most popular self-help book published before the
turn of the nineteenth century, John G. Wells's Every Man His Own
Lawyer and Business Form Book, was advertised to laymen as a "com-
plete guide in all matters of law and business negotiations for every
State of the Union. With legal forms for drawing the necessary pa-
pers, and full instructions for proceeding, without legal assistance, in
suits and business transactions of every description."'"
25 Id.
26 Id. at 242-43. The reporter for decisions of the Supreme Court of New York, published
in 1804, was given "official" status. Id. at 243.
27 Id. at 243. Rhode Island only extended the franchise to non-property-holding white
males in 1843. See generally Rhode Island History (updated by Elmer Cornwell),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/RhodeIslandHistory/chapt4.html.
28 Jeremy Bentham, Letter from Jeremy Bentham, an Englishman, to the Citizens of the Several
American United States, in 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW,
AND EDUCATION 113, 137 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998) ("Why every
man his own lawyer?-l. Because no man's interest is as dear to his lawyer as it is to him-
self. 2. It is not every man that can afford to pay a lawyer. 3. No man, how rich so ever,
can have a lawyer always at his elbow.").
29 FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 246.
30 This was legal lexicographer Giles Jacob's Every Man His Own Lawyer; or A Summary of the
Laws of England in a New and Instructive Method. Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning:
Law Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 273
n.109 (2000).
31 Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of
the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REv'. 121, 126 (2000).
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B. The Dawn of Electronic Legal Research
Perhaps surprisingly, electronic legal research already has a rich
tradition in its own right, dating to 1959.32 In that year the first such
endeavor, known as the Horty Project, was started by Professor John
F. Horty of the University of Pittsburgh Law School to facilitate his
compilation of a "Hospital Law Manual."3  Comprised of punch cards
and computer tape, by 1961, Horty's work allowed users to search the
full text of the Pennsylvania Code by keyword.34  The Horty Project
began a commercial venture, Aspen Systems Corporation, the first
service to allow lawyers to efficiently5 search statutory codes3 6
Inspired by the Horty Project, the Ohio State Bar began experi-
menting with computerized legal research systems in 1966, and by
1971 had put online not only the entire Ohio Code but also, for the
first time, the decisions of courts. Originally launched as Ohio Bar
Automated Research ("OBAR"), the project was renamed "Lexis" in
1973 .
In 1975 the West Publishing Company, publisher of the National
Reporter System and the nation's leading reporting service since the39 40
1870s,35 launched Westlaw, a competing searchable database of deci-
sions.4' By 1982,42 both Lexis and Westlaw were providing users with
32 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in a Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law Schools, and the
Legal Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 797, 818 (2006).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 818 n.133.
35 The searches still took hours to complete, but were quite rightly hailed as the break-
through they were. Id. at 822 n.162.
36 Id. at 818.
37 Id. at 818-19.
38 Id.
39 West's dominance over the market was such that the page numbers used in its National
Reporter System became the industry standard, and when Lexis began incorporating West's
"star pagination" into the text of its opinions in 1985, West asserted a copyright in the
numbers and successfully obtained an injunction. West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Ctr.,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986). In 1998, a lawsuit by the proprietors of the CD-ROM
research program "Authority from Matthew Bender" reversed this precedent. Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
40 Arewa, an applied economist, describes their present-day market position as a "competi-
tive duopoly," Arewa, supra note 32, at 820, and notes their collective nickname "Wexis,"
id. at 821.
41 Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 657 (1996).
42 'Which is to say, before the author of this Comment was born.
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searchable access to cases, statutes, legislative materials, administra-
tive materials, and law review articles.43
C. Legal Research in Prisons
American prisons have long featured modest libraries, dating back
to 1790 when the Philadelphia Prison Society donated books to the
criminals at the Walnut Street Jail." In the 1870s, a survey of thirty-
three state prisons counted 50,663 books among them. 5 In the
1960s, however, a broad rehabilitation-minded movement by "activist
librarians 4 6 began to expand prison library services to include law
books, novels, and academic curricula. In 1971, Congress passed the
Law Enforcement Administration Act, which granted states money
for prison law libraries and other literature.47 There are accounts of
prisoners using stolen novels for currency.48
The American Library Association's 1992 publication of Library
Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions left no room for ambiguity,
acknowledging "the inmates' right to read and their right to free ac-
cess to information," noting also that "[s]ervices shall encompass the
same variety of material, formats, and programs as available in the
outside community."
49
1. Bounds v. Smith
The watershed moment for lawbooks in prisons came in 1977,
when the Supreme Court decided Bounds v. Smith.5 Three inmates of
North Carolina prisons separately sued the Department of Correc-
tions for Eighth Amendment violations, and all asserted that their
constitutional right to access courts entitled them to "legal research
43 Arewa, supra note 32, at 822.
44 Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D: A Bar Examination to Safeguard America's
Jailhouse Layers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming Their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 91, 98 (2006).





49 Id. at 58. Moreover, "[in 1995, the International Federation of Library Associations and
Institutions (IFLA) issued its revised 'Guidelines for Library Services for Prisoners,' which
stated that 'prisoners are as entitled as other citizens to have access to information and
therefore to proper library facilities.'" Id.
50 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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facilities. ' ' 1 On the premise that "'meaningful access' to the courts is
the touchstone' 52 of the inquiry, Justice Marshall's opinion for the
Court concluded without much hesitation, "If a lawyer must perform
such preliminary research, it is no less vital for a pro se prisoner.
53
States, therefore, were deemed constitutionally burdened with the
duty of facilitating prisoner litigation: either through the provision
of law libraries or "some degree of professional or quasi-professional
legal assistance to prisoners."54 The Court advised states that "a legal
access program need not include any particular element we have dis-
cussed, and we encourage local experimentation. ' 5
2. Lewis v. Casey
In 1996, Lewis v. Casey56 repudiated this sentiment and substan-
tially modified the effective scope of Bounds. Twenty-two inmates of
Arizona prisons filed a class action asserting that the State was not ful-
filling its duty to facilitate prisoners' access to legal research. The
District Court ruled for the plaintiffs and issued a "microscopically
detailed order [that left] no stone unturned. It cover[ed] everything
from training in legal research to the ratio of typewriters to prisoners
in each facility.,
57
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia's opinion reversed this judg-
ment on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the
claim at all. Emphasizing that "our decision here ... does not fore-
close alternative means to achieve" the provision of meaningful ac-
cess to courts, Scalia reasoned thus:
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law
library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual in-
jury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance
program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise
analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of
the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by
Bounds is concerned, "meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone," and
the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the
51 Id. at 818.
52 Id. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611, 612, 615 (1974)).
53 Id. at 825-26.
54 Id. at 831.
55 Id. at 832.
56 518 U.S. 343 (1996); see infra note 186.
57 Id. at 390 (Thomas,J, concurring).
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alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim.
In other words, the Court ruled that the Constitution only guarantees
prisoners a right to do legal research at state expense for the pur-
poses of pursuing some other, non-frivolous claim.
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter from the judgment, grasped the
implications of this decision immediately. "At first glance, the novel
approach adopted by the Court today suggests that only those prison-
ers who have been refused the opportunity to file claims later found
to have arguable merit should be able to challenge" their starvation
of information . 9 Even assuming that a prisoner eventually managed
to discover that his rights had been violated, winning on the merits
would require, in the words of another learned commentator, "show-
ing that he or she would have won in court if only better law library
facilities had been available." 6°
Thus, the plight of inmates is even bleaker than Justice Stevens
anticipated. Only those prisoners who have been refused the oppor-
tunity to raise arguable claims, and who (despite not having law-
books) learn that they have been denied this opportunity, and who
(despite not having lawbooks) can articulate how their denial of law-
books caused them prejudice, can challenge their convictions. In
short, an inmate can only vindicate his right to legal research in
courts if he shows that being denied it causes him actual prejudice in
a case.
But the Court did not stop there. Oddly, considering that "at the
very outset of analysis, the Court concluded that it was without the
constitutional authority to begin to address the issues raised,"61 the
majority nonetheless proceeded to restrict the precedential weight of
Bounds in lengthy dicta. Justice Scalia concluded that insofar as
Bounds promises inmates the right to state assistance "to discover
grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court,, 62 it can no longer
be considered good law. Justice Thomas added a twenty-nine page
58 Id. at 351 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The occasional lower court also shows sympathy for
such litigants. See, e.g., Lilly v.Jess, 189 F. App'x. 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We appreciate
that without good access to a law library (for that matter, without a legal education) a
prisoner may never know which suits have been lost (or not filed) because of deficient ac-
cess to legal materials. That obstacle is built into Lewis, however .. ").
60 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 886 (2d ed. 2002).
61 David Steinberger, Note, Lewis v. Casey: Tightening the Boundaries of Prisoner Access to the
Courts?, 18 PAcE L. REv. 377, 417 (1998).
62 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
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concurrence detailing his aversion to Bounds, which went so far as to
disdain "the last half century"63 of liberal jurisprudence.
3. Impact
In the wake of Lewis, states eager to test the new waters rushed to
curtail their prison legal research services. Hot off of its victorious
appeal, Arizona closed all but one of the thirty-five prison law librar-
ies it previously maintained,64 which were costing the State a com-
bined $650,000 a year.65 The State of Washington managed to shave
$1.2 million off the state budget from the reductions it made in its
prison law libraries. 66 The Idaho Department of Corrections auc-
tioned off several of its collections on eBay for $100 and cost of ship-
67ping. Iowa simply dumped the contents of its libraries into the pris-
on courtyard to rot. 8
By and large, the gambles have paid off. The vast majority of pris-
oners' claims for denial of access to legal research are eliminated for
lack of standing. One inmate in Oklahoma was found to lack stand-
ing to claim the right for simply wanting to see opinions from circuits
other than the Tenth. 69 Another, denied access to pre-1950 Supreme
Court opinions, was then denied standing because "he does not al-
lege how" this deprivation hurt him. 7o The Third Circuit even denied
standing to an inmate transferred to a special facility to await a post-
conviction relief hearing, who on arrival had all of his legal files con-
fiscated.7' These cases do nothing but beg the question: Without the
63 Id. at 365 (Thomas,J., concurring).
64 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1633 n.268 (2003).
65 Jill Schachner Chanen, Banned in the Bighouse, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1998, at 26. Moreover, Ari-
zona purged most of the texts at the remaining library. "Gone are the federal, state and
regional case law reporters, the legal encyclopedias and the federal and state annotated
statutes. The 16 law books that remain on the shelves include non-annotated Arizona
statutes, state and district court rules, portions of the US. Code, court forms, and a few
self-help manuals." Id.
66 Schlanger, supra note 64, at 1633 n.268.
67 Seamone, supra note 44, at 91.
68 Id.
69 Fisher v. Mullin, 213 F. App'x. 698, 703 (10th Cir. 2007).
70 Hairston v. Nash, No. 06-5219, 2007 MIL 2390432, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2007).
71 Gordon v. Morton, 131 F. App'x. 797 (3d Cir. 2005). Then-Judge Samuel Alito was on
the panel that found the appellant lacked standing. See also Garland v. Horton, 129 F.
App'x. 733 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding petitioner lacked standing where he was kept in re-
strictive housing for two months and only returned to the section of the prison with the
law library one week before his filing deadline).
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documents, how are the inmates supposed to know how their contents could
have helped their cases?
However, not every case goes against the pro se prisoner. States
must still provide some prisoners with lawbooks. Lewis itself makes
clear that standing exists where an inmate shows
failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficien-
cies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known.
Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring
before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library
72that he was unable even to file a complaint.
Lower courts have found other situations that create standing to
sue. One was found when prison officials seized and destroyed all of
an inmate's legal files, and he alleged-but did not specify-
prejudice to an ongoing civil rights action.73 Another is an "exact
cite" system, one that only provides prisoners with cases they request
74by the specific citation. In one especially egregious exact cite case,
an inmate "allege [d] conditions of confinement that would make the
filing of a lawsuit practically impossible even for a trained attor-
ney[:] .. no physical access to the law library, no access to cases
twenty pages or longer, access to cases only by citation .... ",7 The
prisoner missed a filing deadline as a result. The Ninth Circuit not
only found him to have standing to sue, but also remedied his injury
by equitably tolling the statute of limitations.76
Additionally, courts have found that the right of access to courts
extends to require prisons to provide "some means of preparing legal
documents, including a means of binding them where required,",77 and
to furnish prisoners with "[t] he right to Xerox."
78
72 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 341, 351 (1996).
73 See Montana v. Hargett, 151 F. App'x. 633, 636 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he right prohibits
prison officials from affirmatively hindering a prisoner's efforts to construct a nonfrivo-
lous appeal or claim, including the improper destruction of a prisoner's legal materials."
(citing Green v.Johnson, 977 F.2d 1383, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1992))).
74 See, e.g., Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Clayton v. Tansy,
26 F.3d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1993)); Skelton v. Bruce, No. 06-3045, 2007 WIL 1469652, at
*4-*5 (D. Kans. May 21, 2007). But see Baca v. Mondragon, No. 96-2027, 1996 WL
330290, at *2 (10th Cir. June 6, 1996).
75 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 2004).
76 Id. at 936.
77 Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
78 Muhammad v. Collins, 241 F. App'x. 498, 499 (10th Cir. 2007) (dictum) (quotingJones v.
Franzen, 697 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1983)). Note that the Tenth Circuit quotes a Sev-
enth Circuit case, illustrating the possibility that the petitioner in Fisher v. Muffin, 213 F.
App'x. 698 (10th Cir. 2007), was in fact prejudiced by the denial of his request for other
circuit's caselaw. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Only three prisoners have ever brought claims for a right to do le-
gal research on the Internet, 79 and all three have ultimately been de-
nied. In direct conflict with Lewis, two of these were denied for fail-
ure to meet what could fairly be described as a technical
requirement. The first of these cases claimed the right under state
discovery rules rather than under Bounds or Lewis.8° The other was a
much more novel case: originally incarcerated in the District of Co-
lumbia, the petitioner was attacked in prison and was moved for his
own protection to a facility in California. He sued the District for
failure to protect him, but the California facility lacked legal materi-
als for D.C. A California state court ordered the prison to provide
him access to Findlaw.com. On appeal, however, the court reversed
the order because the petitioner had never specifically pleaded a re-
81quest for Internet access.
The third case might strike the reader as much more pernicious.
Standley, an inmate, claimed a denial of his due process rights at his
parole hearing, and a judge denied the claim. In his report, the
judge cited cases that were only available through LexisNexis or West-
law. The inmate sued for simply the right to view these cases, but his
request was refused. Without elaborating, the denying court found
unconvincingly that "the cases cited for major tenets of law are re-
ported in volumes presumably available to Standley. Therefore, to the
extent that some peripheral cases were not available to him, Standley
has not been unduly prejudiced.
8 2
Meanwhile, states have not opted to provide Internet access volun-
tarily as an alternative. Only a few states offer any electronic legal re-
search at all, but do so using DVD-based software rather than an In-
ternet connection."' North Carolina stands out as the one state to use
the Internet in prisons successfully-as a teaching tool for prisoners,
offering them web-based college coursework in a program in con-
79 Based on Westlaw "All Federal" and "All States" searches for: "'bounds v. smith' /p inter-
net" and "'lewis v. casey' /p internet," as ofJanuary 2008.
80 Tuvalu v. Woodford, No. CIV S-04-1724, 2006 WL 3201096, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006).
The court added, "Plaintiff has [not] cited and the court has not found any case suggest-
ing that an inmate's right of access to the courts includes the right of access to the inter-
net for research." Id. Note that all three of these cases considering the claim are unpub-
lished. Moreover, the lower court opinion of In re Ashford, No. D048210, 2007 WL 106180
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2007, as modified Feb. 6, 2007), is not even available on Westlaw.
81 In re Ashford, 2007 WL 106180.
82 Standley v. Dennison, No. 9:05--CV-1033, 2007 WiL 2406909, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2007) (emphasis added).
83 See supra note 11.
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junction with the University of North Carolina. 4 Minnesota briefly
experimented with providing Internet-connected computers to in-
mates as part of an award-winning inmate telemarketing programs
but was forced to end the program after one of its participants-in
the midst of a twenty-three year sentence for child molestation-was
discovered to have downloaded 280 images of child pornography. 6
Indeed, this embarrassment sparked the introduction of the Stop
Trafficking of Pornography in Prison (STOPP) Act of 1998, which
would have barred federal inmates from accessing the Internet with-
out permission and obligated the Attorney General to oversee state
provision of Internet in prisons.8 7
D. Legal Research in the Internet Age
Justice Stevens summarized his Lewis dissent in a footnote: "Al-
though a prisoner would lose on the merits if he alleged that the de-
privation of that right [of meaningful access to courts] occurred be-
cause the State, for example, did not provide him with access to on-
line computer databases, he would also certainly have 'standing' to
make his claim.8 8 Since 1996, however, our country and the rest of
the world have witnessed an unprecedented revolution in the way
humanity accesses information. Today, 71% of American adults use
the Internet, and 47% have broadband connections in their homes. 9
In all, 68% of American households are connected to the Internet in
some form or another.9° All of these homes can access the entire In-
ternet in all its uncensored glory.
84 Esposito, supra note 6, at 64.
85 Id.
86 See Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998 and Related Proposals: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 105th Cong. 25 (1998) [hereinafter Child Protection Hearing]
(statement of Hon. Deborah Pryce, Rep. in Congress from the State of Ohio), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58761.000/hju58761_0.HTM
("Due to excellent law enforcement, the Federal authorities caught the prisoner with a
computer disk containing 280 pictures of juveniles engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct."); Esposito, supra note 6, at 53 (noting that the prisoner was found guilty of violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) for possessing child pornography).
87 Child Protection Hearing, supra note 86; Esposito, supra note 6, at 52-53.
88 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 408 n.5 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Eric Benderoff, High-Speed Internet Hits Home: African-Americans' Usage Is Up Sharply Since
'05, Study Says, CHI. TRiB., July 6, 2007, § 3, at 1. Twenty percent of Americans have a
wireless network in their homes. Trends & Innovations, INVESTOR's BUS. DAILY, Feb. 27,
2007, at A02.
90 William E. Kennard, Spreading the Broadband Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at A13.
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Most significantly, when Stevens penned this dictum in 1996, only
28% of U.S. public libraries provided visitors with computers featur-
ing free access to the Internet.
9' In 2005 that figure reached 99%.
92
Hence, for all practical purposes, every person in this country now
enjoys the liberty to surf the Internet as he pleases-with the con-
spicuous exception of prisoners.
Even more dramatic has been the proliferation of free legal re-
search websites. When Lewis came down, there were basically two
such sources, and both were dismissible as efforts of academics. The
Supreme Court began posting opinions online for public access in
1990, having been persuaded to do so by faculty of Case Western Re-
serve School of Law; and in 1992, Cornell Law School launched the
Legal Information Institute, a website that allowed users freely to
search its collection of cases and statutes.93
Although universities continue to play a vital and innovative role
in the increasing digitization of the Internet,94 the most significant
developments in free legal research databases have quite eagerly
been provided by the courts and legislatures themselves. Thirty-nine
states operate government top-level domain websites (mostly ".gov" or
".us") that allow users to search the statute books by keyword, and
several of these offer advanced search functions9  Another twenty
states have opted to contract this service out to private publishers, or
at least to link government websites to already-existing websites that
provide searchable statutes. Only one state--North Dakota-has post-
ed nothing online to provide their citizens with the ability to search
91 Steve Lohr, Libraries Wired, and Reborn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at GI.
92 Gretchen Ruethling, Almost All Libraries in U.S. Offer Free Access, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005,
at A14. Meanwhile, visits to public libraries have more than doubled nationally, most
likely as a consequence of this Internet accessibility. Id. The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation has provided generous technology grants to libraries serving poor counties.
Lohr, supra note 91.
93 Carol A. Parker, Institutional Repositories and the Principle of Open Access: Changing the Way
We Think about Legal Scholarship, 37 N.M. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2007).
94 See, e.g., id. at 9 (explaining that seven new Legal Information Institutes modeled after the
Cornell program now serve the English-speaking world, and describing Berkeley Elec-
tronic Press' Legal Repository ("bepress"), a new service provided by the University of
California, which makes forthcoming legal research-such as Parker's article-freely ac-
cessible and searchable); see also Washington and Lee University's Law Library Journal
Finder, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/resolver.aspx.
95 These figures are based on the author's own Google searches for each state name, plus
statutes."
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the statute books by keyword, although even it offers its statutes on a
government website 96 in browse-only form.
Although United States Supreme Court opinions have been on-
line since 1990, well before the Lewis opinion, since 2003 the Internet
has allowed users to listen to audio recordings of oral arguments be-
fore the Court dating back to 1955 via the website Oyez.org, a private
venture supported in large part by the National Science Foundation.97
This site provides visitors a unique perspective on not only legal is-
sues, but also-of particular importance to pro se plaintiffs-the mas-
tery of oral advocacy.
Meanwhile, state supreme and appellate courts have typically
picked arbitrary dates and provided decisions from those dates for-
ward.9 Delaware even provides digital opinions from its trial courts.
9
These court websites are increasingly adding search capabilities to
their databases, 00 a trend that is only bound to accelerate as the costs
of doing so decline.
The Federal Courts-in addition to operating websites to rival the
States'1°-also administer the Internet-based Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) system, which "provides access to the
case summary, the docket entries, and in many jurisdictions copies of
documents filed in federal cases. 'l° Although PACER charges users
$0.08 for each page generated, the Judicial Conference of the United
States approved a measure in 2001 not to charge users until they ac-
96 N.D. CENT. CODE (2007), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/information/statites/cent-
code.html.
97 Oyez, Supreme Court Case Summaries, Oral Arguments & Multimedia,
http://www.oyez.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
98 David Whelan, Opinions Online: An Increasing Number of Courts Are Offering Web Access, L.
TECH. NEws,July 2006, at 8. "Some courts, such as Connecticut and Delaware, have opin-
ions from 2000 on. Others go back further-Alaska to the 1960s or California to the
1850s.... In Ohio, Supreme Court opinions are available since 1992; Court of Appeals
start anywhere from 1999 to 2001, depending on thejurisdiction." Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. "Tennessee uses dtSearch Corp.'s dtSearch.... Hawaii and Ohio both use the Google
Search tool. North Dakota," one of the two states that does not allow visitors to search its
statutes by keyword, "uses Microsoft's Index Server, which many websites use as a free
search tool packaged with their Microsoft Windows server." Id.
101 The Tenth Circuit Court provides opinions dating back to 1997. All the other courts of
appeals store opinions at least back to 1995. See Timothy L. Coggins, Legal, Factual and
Other Internet Sites for Attorneys and Others, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 17, 23-25 (2005) (listing
and commenting on hundreds of law-related websites).
102 Public Access to Court Electronic Records Frequently Asked Questions,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). See generally Kimberly
Koscielniak, Litigation Searching, 83 MICH. BJ. 44 (May, 2004) (describing functionality of
PACER).
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crue a $10 charge in a calendar year, and courts are explicitly permit-
ted "for good cause, [to] exempt persons or classes of persons from
the electronic public access fees, in order to avoid unreasonable bur-
dens and to promote public access to such information. '0 3 PACER
thus not only offers users (such as, potentially, pro se prisoner liti-
gants) the control and convenience of overseeing one's own docket,
but also a revolutionary new breakthrough in legal research: the abil-
ity to view ready-made briefs (so called "e-briefs").'04
Perhaps the most consequential change since Lewis has been the
appearance of free law-related "portals."'' ° Of these, practitioners
rate most highly'06 Findlaw.com, 0 7 a subsidiary of West Publishing and
winner of the 2007 "Webby" for Best Law Website 0 8 Findlaw.com al-
lows free searches of the constitutions, codes, and opinions of the
federal government and every state. From its main page it offers links
to various practice areas-such as civil rights and criminal law-with
relevant links a click away. Similar portal sites include LexisNexis's
competitor service LexisONE'1 9 and Nolo," ° the latter of which gen-
erates revenue from advertising (mostly for lawyers) rather than
through channeling users to "pay as you go" Shepardizing (or KeyCit-
ing) services like the other two."' Even Wikipedia contains enough
103 Id.
104 See Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on the Web: Electronic Dynamos or Legal Quag-
mire?, 97 LAw LIBR.J. 467 (2005); see also id. at 471 (quoting Peter Davis, former President
of the American Academy of Lawyers: "E-briefs are absolutely essential for appellate
work.... I have no doubt this is the wave of the future.").
105 "A portal is a Web site that collects and organizes other Web sites." Thomas Keefe, Inter-
net Legal Portals, 94 ILL. BJ. 264 (2006).
106 According to a recent survey by the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center. Id.
107 FindLaw.com, http://www.findlaw.com/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). It maintains a spe-
cial section on criminal justice. Findlaw Criminal Law Center, http://criminal.findlaw.
com/crimes/criminal-rights/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
108 Press Release, Findlaw.com, Thomson FindLaw Wins Three Honors at 2007 Webby
Awards (May 24, 2007), http://company.findlaw.com/pr/2007/052407.2007webby.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (burying two "Official Honoree Awards" in the fourth para-
graph). It also won the 2000 Webby for Politics and Law. Winda Benedetti, Four Seattle
Sites Named Among the Best on the Web, May 15, 2000, SEATtLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, at C2.
But cf Jack Shafer, What? You've Not Been Honored by the Webbys?, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2188581/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) ("Entering your Web site
in the Webby Awards is a little like buying a box of Cracker Jack-everybody wins a
prize.").
109 Geared to solo and small firm attorneys. LexisONE, http://www.lexisone.com (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2008).
110 Nolo, http://www.nolo.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
111 Keefe, supra note 105.
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information about laws that imagining it saving an inmate's freedom
or even life is not too farfetched.
1 1 2
Law-related blogs (or, as they are unfortunately nicknamed,
"blawgs") presently number in the thousands, 13 and can only be ex-
pected to continue to grow in quantity, quality, and import. Momen-
tously, the Supreme Court cited a document posted on law professor
Douglas Berman's "Sentencing Law & Policy" blawg" 4 in a 2005 foot-
note. 1 5 More recently, a Ninth Circuit dissent joined by five judges
quoted an entire block of text from "The Volokh Conspiracy.""6 Ad-
ditionally, legal "wikis"-collaborative Internet encyclopedias, the
content of which are produced entirely by users" 7-have begun to
crop up addressed to topics both general and specific. 9
These trends are irreversible, and we are merely witnessing the in-
fancy of free legal research on the Internet. It is hardly an overstate-
ment to predict that an age of regular judicial citation to Internet re-
sources-whether to documents filed through PACER, or to blawgs
and legal wikis-is just around the corner. Indeed, it is only slightly
premature to declare that a comprehensive, definitive legal wiki is at
112 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antiterrorismand EffectiveDeathPenaltyAct of_1996
(last visited Mar. 25, 2008); Habeas corpus, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habeas-corpus
(last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
113 See, e.g., Michael J. Tonsing, The State of the Legal Blawgosphere, FED. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 14.
114 Sentencing Law & Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencingjaw-and-policy
(last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
115 U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 277 n.4 (2005) (Stevens,J., with Souter,J., ScaliaJ., dissent-
ing in part) (citing Memorandum from Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't. of Justice, Criminal Div., to all Federal Prosecutors, Guidance Regarding the Ap-
plication of Blakely v. Washington to Pending Cases, at 8, available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/files/chris wray-doj-memo
.pdf).
116 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (O'Scannlain,J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see Tonsing, supra note 113, at 14 (noting
the dissent's use of the block quotes from the blawg).
117 See generally Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) ("A wiki
is software that allows users to easily create, edit, and link pages together."). The concept
of the "wiki" (the term comes from the Hawaiian word for "fast") dates back to 1994, but
only came into public consciousness at the turn of the millennium when the Nupedia In-
ternet encyclopedia project was relaunched as Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
118 See, e.g., Wex, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Main-Page (last visited Mar.
25, 2008) (providing a wild legal dictionary hosted by Cornell's Legal Information Insti-
tute); Legal Wikia, http://legal.wikia.com/wiki/Main-Page (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
119 See, e.g., Michigan Family Law Wiki, http://lawpedia.jot.com/WikiHome (last visited Mar.
25, 2008).
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this point an inevitability; the better question is whether this day is a
hundred years away or a hundred hours.
E. Security
Naturally, the proposition of extending Internet access to prison-
ers raises myriad security concerns. It would be outside the scope of
this Comment-and probably outside the scope of a federal court's
jurisdiction-to dictate to states precisely how best to allay these con-
cerns. Indeed, it is desirable to encourage states to experiment with
how best to provide inmates with Internet access. This Part seeks sim-
ply to show that several manageable solutions are readily available.
The most basic solution is "white-list filtering," whereby network
users can only access those law-related sites that the administrator has
already pre-approved. 2 0  This solution is technically uncomplicated
and has the virtue of ensuring that inmates only view pre-approved
material; it does, however, require the intensive upfront labor of
identifying appropriate law-related websites before putting the system
online.
The alternative is "black-list filtering" (used by most public librar-
ies), which is essentially software programmed to block access to cer-
tain categories of content (usually pornography, but just as easily all
non-legal sites).121 "Black-list filtering" requires less effort to set up,
but risks filtering out too much desirable content and too little unde-
sirable content. 12  The problem, in other words, is that "black-list" fil-
tering leads to overbroad Internet censorship, thus denying prisoners
access to potentially useful legal resources. 2 3 Under Turner v. Safely,
however, this overbreadth is constitutionally tolerable as "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests,"'' 24 as long as the filtering
software still provides meaningful access to a minimal handful of suit-
able law-related websites. Additionally, states would presumably be
free to monitor-or in extreme cases, to deny-Internet access to so-
120 E-mail from Frederick Benenson, Creative Commons Cultural Fellow, to author (Nov. 1,
2006, 18:28 EST) (on file with author); see also RICHARD A. SPINELLO, REGULATING
CYBERSPACE: THE POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROL, 55-59, 116-21 (2002) (dis-
cussing the technology, ethics, and constitutionality of black-list filtering).
121 Id.
122 Id..
123 See, e.g., Sites Blocked by Internet Filtering Programs: Edelman Expert Report for Mult-
nomah County Public Library et al. vs. United States of America, et al., available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/mul-v-us/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
124 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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phisticated prisoners convicted or reasonably suspected of computer
"hacking" or related offenses.'
2 5
To summarize, our nation has a rich history of disseminating legal
materials for the benefit of the populace. Since the mid-1990s, how-
ever, society has turned a corner in how it accesses information-
legal and otherwise-and there is no turning back. It is in this light
that the right of prisoners to use these rich and free resources must
be contemplated; Part III presents the constitutional arguments
needed to make it so.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The underlying animus of Justices Scalia and Thomas towards the
Bounds right is that it has no clear basis in the Constitution. It trou-
bles them when the Court creates unfounded mandates for states to
treat prisoners "fairly" without clear textual authority to do so. More
to the point, they think the Constitution actually requires them to ab-
stain from such interference. The modern history of prisoners'
rights, they believe,
rest[s] on the unstated (and erroneous) presumption that the Constitu-
tion contains an implicit definition of incarceration. Because the Consti-
tution contains no such definition, States are free to define and redefine
all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various
types of deprivations-provided only that those deprivations are consistent with
the Eighth Amendment.1
6
The purpose of this Part is to reestablish the place of the pro se
prisoner's right of meaningful access to courts in the text of the Con-
stitution. Justice Souter's latest attempt identified the Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause,
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.2 7 With all
apologies to the Justice, this Comment addresses these in reverse, and
begins with one he did not name: the aforementioned Eighth
Amendment.
125 It is worth noting that in the context of meaningful access to law libraries cases, courts
seem far more concerned that prisoners are too illiterate to benefit from the facilities,
than that they are so literate as to pose a security risk.
126 Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582-83 (2006) (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., concurring)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139 (2003)
(Thomas,J., with ScaliaJ., concurring)).
127 Christoper v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002) (SouterJ.) (citations omitted).
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A. The Eighth Amendment
This argument need but take a few words. By any reasonable
definition, it is cruel and unusual for the law to deprive prisoners of
the law.
Justices have differed, of course, on their definitions of "cruel"
and "unusual."'' 5 But it is perhaps Justice Scalia's originalist defini-
tion-which takes the meaning of the words among the legal com-
munity of the Framing Generation-that does the most to show the
unconstitutionality of a punishment unconstrained by law.
In the legal world of the time, and in the context of restricting punish-
ment determined by the Crown (or the Crown's judges), "illegall" and
"unusuall" were identical for practical purposes. Not all punishments
were specified by statute; many were determined by the common
law.... A requirement that punishment not be "unusuall"-that is, not
contrary to "usage" (Lat. "usus") or "precedent"-was primarily a re-
quirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds
of common-law tradition."'
In short, Justice Scalia more than any other is committed to the
view that the Eighth Amendment rests on a concept of punishment as
inherently legal. It is plain that such a system logically requires a
meaningful right of a prisoner to vindicate his legal rights; otherwise
the concept would be self-defeating. The Court should remain within
the Bounds of common-law tradition, indeed.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The relevant principle of equal protection is that the state may
not deny justice to the indigent. At least in the pre-conviction con-
text, this principle was settled in Gideon v. Wainright
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have
the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxu-
ries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
128 Compare Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("Severe, manda-
tory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having
been employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history."), with Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 266 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Clause ... guards against
the abuse of power; ... the prohibition of the Clause is not confined to such penalties
and punishment as were inflicted by the Stuarts." (quotation marks and alterations omit-
ted)).
129 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (quoting Declaration of Rights, 1689, 2 W. & M., 2 (Eng.)).
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fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
130
ours.
By analogy, our society has now (or very soon will have) irreversibly
reached the point where a litigant's right to get legal information
online is valued as a necessity, and not a luxury. To put it differently,
any defendant out on bail would be expected to look up some infor-
mation about the charges against him on the Internet. Hence, a
straightforward interpretation of the principles of Gideon should re-
quire states to give defendants who are not out on bail access as well.
In the context of discretionary appeals, habeas petitions, civil
rights actions, and any other category of potential prisoner litigation,
by contrast, indigent prisoners lose the right to state-appointed coun-
sel, on the theory that justice has already been done for them.
1 3'
Hence, after Bounds and Lewis, their only reliable 32 means by which
to vindicate legal rights is self-education with whatever resources the
State sees fit to provide them.
In Justice Thomas's view, the reason for the distinction in treat-
ment is that "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the
States an 'affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differ-
ences in economic circumstances." 13 3 The notion is that defendants
130 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
131 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974) ("[1]t is ordinarily the defendant, rather than
the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the
State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by ajudge orjury below.
The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being
'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather
as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.").
132 For lack of a better alternative, convicts are free to seek the assistance of fellow inmates
on legal projects. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), abrogated by Shaw v. Murphy, 532
U.S. 223, 231 n.3 (2001) (imposing standing requirement). However competent some
writ writers might be, at the very least, there is no way for an indigent prisoner to know, a
priori, whether any particular writ writer is reliable. Hence, their assistance ought to be
considered too unreliable to render the Prison Litigation Reform Act "three strikes" pro-
vision constitutional. See infra Part III.D. Then-Justice Rehnquist quoted at some length
the problem of
a few unscrupulous manipulators who are interested only in acquiring
from other prisoners money, cigarettes, or merchandise purchased in the inmate
canteen. Once they have a "client's" interest aroused and determine his ability to
pay, they must keep him on the "hook." This is commonly done by deliberately
misstating the facts of his case so that it appears, at least on the surface, that the
inmate is entitled to relief.
Cnz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 n.7 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Charles
Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAL. L. REv. 343, 348-49 (1968)). For a practi-
cal answer to this problem, see Seamone, supra note 44 (proposing a modified bar ex-
amination for "jailhouse lawyers" to ensure their competence).
133 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375 n.5 (1996) (Thomas,J., concurring) (quoting Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Harlan,J., with StewartJ., dissenting)). The quota-
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are entitled to counsel only because the government seeks to impose
the affirmative burden of a jail sentence on them. Justice Thomas be-
lieves that once people have been validly deprived of their freedom,
those who are unable to afford outside counsel have no right to ex-
pect the state to provide them the tools to try to get out ofjail.
However, societal circumstances have changed since Lewis: in
1996, the act of incarceration did not usually deprive convicts of the
liberty to go to an Internet-connected public library; and now in 99%
of cases it does. 34 By virtue of the affirmative act of imprisoning indi-
viduals, the question is not, as Justice Thomas would construe it,
whether the state has "an affirmative duty to lift the handicap []," but
rather whether the state may legitimately impose such an affirmative
handicap as the denial of vital information as a consequence of im-
prisonment.
Justice Blackmun's response to the rape of a transsexual inmate
left in the general male population of a maximum-security facility is
salient:
It is society's responsibility to protect the life and health of its prisoners.
"[W] hen a sheriff or a marshall [sic] takes a man from the courthouse in
a prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three or ten
years, this is our act. We have tolled the bell for him. And whether we like
it or not, we have made him our collective responsibility. We are free to
do something about him; he is not.,
3
5
tion continues, "[t]o so construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philosophy of
leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic concepts of the proper relations be-
tween government and society." Id. Accord Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35 (1956)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o economic burden attendant upon the exercise of a privi-
lege bears equally upon all, and in other circumstances the resulting differentiation is not
treated as an invidious classification by the State, even though discrimination against 'in-
digents' by name would be unconstitutional. Thus, while the exclusion of 'indigents'
from a free state university would deny them equal protection, requiring the payment of
tuition fees surely would not, despite the resulting exclusion of those who could not af-
ford to pay the fees. And if imposing a condition of payment is not the equivalent of a
classification by the State in one case, I fail to see why it should be so regarded in another.
Thus if requiring defendants in felony cases to pay for a transcript constitutes a discrimi-
natory denial to indigents of the right of appeal available to others, why is it not a similar
denial in misdemeanor cases or, for that matter, civil cases?").
134 See supra Part II.D.
135 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Ad-
dress by The Chief Justice, 25 REc. OF THE ASSN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 14, 17
(Supp. Mar. 1970.); cf Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("If a State elects to impose imprisonment as a punishment for crime, I believe it
has an obligation to provide the persons in its custody with a health care system which
meets minimal standards of adequacy.... For denial of medical care is surely not part of
the punishment which civilized nations may impose for crime.").
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Conservative Justices have embraced this position (albeit in the due
process context),"56 and in the words of one appellate court, "the
state-created danger doctrine has become a staple of our constitu-
tional law."137
It is well established that the State cannot affirmatively obstruct
prisoners from filing court papers, regardless of the substance of the
underlying lawsuit. 3 1 Justice Stevens, for one, has indicated that he
would extend this logic to give ample protections to the rights of in-
carcerated indigents to research legal claims.
[B]ecause prisoners are uniquely subject to the control of the State, and
because unconstitutional restrictions on the right of access to the
courts-whether through nearly absolute bars like that in Hull or
through inadequate legal resources-frustrate the ability of prisoners to
identify, articulate, and present to courts injuries flowing from that con-
trol, I believe that any prisoner who claims to be impeded by such barriers has al-
leged constitutionally sufficient injury in fact.
39
To bring this argument into the new millennium, the state's act of
jailing individuals removes them from a society in which any citizen
136 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., with White, J., Stevens, J., O'Connor, J., Scalia, J., & Kennedy, J.) ("The
affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's pre-
dicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it
has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. In the substantive due process
analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on
his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of
personal liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the
Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms in-
flicted by other means." (citation omitted)).
137 Bennett v. City of Phila., 499 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2007); see also id. ("[T]o establish a
claim based on the state-created danger doctrine, a plaintiff must satisfy the following
elements: (1) the harm caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted
with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) some relationship existed be-
tween the state and the plaintiff that renders plaintiff a foreseeable victim; and (4) 'a state
actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen
or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at
all.'" (quoting Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006)).
138 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (rejecting prison regulation requiring submis-
sion of legal documents to prison official for approval before they could be filed in
court); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."); cf Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("But if a prisoner incarcerated
pursuant to a final judgment of conviction is not prevented from physical access to the
federal courts in order that he may file therein petitions for relief which Congress has au-
thorized those courts to grant, he has been accorded the only constitutional right of ac-
cess to the courts that our cases have articulated in a reasoned way." (citing Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. at 549)).
139 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 409 (1996) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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may freely sit down at any public library computer and teach himself
how to defend his rights. It moreover removes them from a world
where, for no cost, the citizen can manage his docket or monitor
those of cases relevant to his. 40 The act of imprisonment today af-
firmatively handicaps the indigent convict from any access to these
resources, and because non-indigent convicts are still guaranteed the
right to pay somebody to use these potentially critical resources for
them,'' the result is invidious discrimination against the poor. The
Equal Protection Clause cannot accept this result.
C. The Due Process Clauses
The constitutional text most likely to give inmates the right to use
the Internet for legal research and docket management regardless of
economic status is found in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment. These Clauses not only provide a univer-
sally accepted ground for a right of access to courts, 142 but also are
traditionally far more flexible and accommodative of social changes.
Indeed, "[t]he concept of due process is, 'perhaps, the least frozen
concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most ab-
sorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society."1 43 The
challenge, then, is to show that today (or someday soon), society has
reached (or will reach) the point where it deems the individual's in-
terest in accessing web-based legal resources to outweigh any gov-
ernment interest in denying him that data.
The first step to get there is determining which due process stan-
dard governs the analysis. There are two candidates: the long-
prevailing Mathews v. Eldridge44 three-factor balancing test, or the
seemingly spartan test for criminal prosecutions laid down one year
140 See supra Part II.D.
141 See, e.g., Clement v. Cal. Dep't. of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down
prison regulation forbidding inmates from receiving print-outs of websites in the mail).
142 See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 381 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging a limited right of
prisoners to access courts rooted in due process).
143 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Cafeteria &
Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("'[D]ue process,' unlike some
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances." (quoting joint Anti-Fascist Coizin. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
144 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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later in Patterson v. New York, 145 which has of late come back into
146vogue.
At the very least, Patterson governs the procedural due process
rights of pro se defendants in criminal prosecutions, and might thus
give rise to a right to Internet access for these defendants. 47 Patterson
has only been applied in the pre-conviction context, but its overarch-
ing logic, "that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as
to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual
States,1 48 naturally extends to the appellate context too. Hence, this
Part argues that both tests should lead to the conclusion that due pro-
cess guarantees the objects of criminal justice-pre-conviction or
post-conviction-the freedom to do legal research online, although
presently the right only goes to convicts.
1. Patterson and the Rights of Defendants and Direct Appellants
Patterson only overturns criminal procedures that are found offen-
sive to custom. At first glance, this seems to guarantee shamefully
threadbare constitutional protection to criminal defendants and to
defer unimaginably to state legislatures:
Among other things, it is normally within the power of the State to regu-
late procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the bur-
den of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, and its deci-
sion in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process
Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
14
9
However, because our society traditionally values the rights of crimi-
nal defendants so absolutely, this standard should be thought of as
providing as rich a tradition of purely procedural safeguards as any
society has ever had.
The narrow holding of Patterson is that states may assign the bur-
den of proof on affirmative defenses to defendants, and so in this
technically procedural regard the case narrows defendants' rights.
But before coming to its conclusion, the Court found special signifi-
145 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
146 In Medina, 505 U.S. 437, the Court ruled that a statute placing the burden of proving the
defense of incompetency to stand trial was not violative of due process. A majority of the
Court applied the Patterson test, two concurring Justices applied Mathews, and two dis-
sented on the grounds that neither test applied.
147 Special note to any pro se defendant reading this Comment: your time would be infinitely
better spent getting a lawyer.
148 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201, quoted in Medina, 505 U.S. at 445.
149 Id. at 201-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cance in the fact that criminal defendants at common law bore the
burden of proving all affirmative defenses, implying that this carved
out a particular exception to the rule to presume in defendants' fa-150
vor. The Court even inserted a proviso into this exception to the
rule of protecting defendants, deeming the burden of proof to be
appropriately placed on defendants only when doing so serves the
overarching interests of knowledge and justice at little or no oppor-
tunity cost to the defendant.'
1
The key to prevailing over the Patterson due process standard is
not to identify a relevant common law practice from which the state is
deviating, but rather to identify a relevant "principle of justice" that
the state obstructs at the expense of those it accuses of crime.
Hence, Patterson can quite appropriately be used on a defendant's
behalf in the pre-conviction stage to argue that defendants in jail
awaiting trial are entitled to Internet access behind bars. Doing so
would advance the same social interests injustice and knowledge that
the Court pointed to in Patterson. 12 Moreover, it is easy to see the in-
finite number of ways that providing this access could inform a de-
fendant's exercise of "those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, in-
cluding the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right
to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for
doing so. ' '153 The critical step is arguing that denying defendants this
access "offends" one of these principles of justice,5 and two charac-
teristics of modern America make this so.
150 Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *201; MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW
255 (1762)).
151 Id. at 203 n.9 ("'The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the
burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a de-
fendant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to
make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or
explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowl-
edge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subject-
ing the accused to hardship or oppression."' (emphasis added) (quoting Morrison v. Cali-
fornia, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934)); see also Medina, 505 U.S. at 460 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
152 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 203 n.9
153 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975)). Defendants could use the Internet to read up
on the law to better collaborate with their attorneys in making these decisions, or to help
track down otherwise unreachable witnesses. Perhaps even more critically, defendants
could also use the Internet to obtain independent information about the qualifications of
their attorneys-to get a better idea of the extent to which they will need to (literally)
take the law into their own hands.
154 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202.
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First, the Internet is now society's preeminent self-educational re-
source;15 second, public defenders are chronically overworked and
underfunded.156  In combination, these circumstances mean that a
minimally computer-literate, indigent defendant stands to improve
vastly the effectiveness of his state-appointed counsel at a relatively
small cost to the state.
Courts, however, have tended not to see it this way.17 Although
both defendants and convicts are entitled to "a certain minimum
standard of 'assistance"'" 8 in their legal pursuits, the Circuit Courts of
Appeal have not extended Bounds to the rights of defendants. This
conclusion has not, however, been unanimous.
5 9
The same analysis would apply in the post-conviction context, at
least insofar as the convict enjoys a state-law privilege' 6° to appeal his
conviction. In this arena, due process guarantees indigent convicts
the same rights accorded to them as to defendants under Gideon.
[A] State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
differences [in criminal appellate procedure] so long as the result does
not amount to a denial of due process or an 'invidious discrimination.'
Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we of-
ten sustain them. But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indi-
gent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.161
By precisely the same reasoning, courts would likely deny a direct ap-
pellant's claim for legal research, but this result is wrong. In this age
in which online information is becoming as much a necessity as an
155 See supra Part II.D.
156 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet To Be Realized, CHAMPION, Mar. 1998, at
12.
157 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 93-94
(2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d, 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1990)); Peterkin v.
Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 643 (7th
Cir. 1987); Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 914 (10th Cir. 1985); Storseth v. Spell-
man, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360
(4th Cir. 1978).
158 Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 96.
159 Id. at 100 (Oakes, S.C.J. concurring) ("While a defendant does not necessarily have a con-
stitutional right to hybrid representation, I do not believe that the state may constitution-
ally bar a defendant represented by ineffective counsel from meaningfully accessing the
court in propria persona in order to preserve his right to an effective defense at such a criti-
cal stage of the proceedings.").
160 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("An appeal from ajudgment of conviction
is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions
allowing such appeal.").
161 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (citations omitted); accord Evitts v. Lu-
cey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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attorney, 62 Patterson properly demands that prisoners be provided
such access at least insofar as their first appeal is heard. The issue is
not one of "[a]bsolute equality," but rather of not doing offense to
the very principles of justice "by which the quality of our civilization
may be judged.' 63
2. Mathews, Turner, and the Rights of Convicts
As was explained above,1M the protections of Patterson do not ex-
tend beyond the first appeal as of right. At this point, the state is
considered free to do to convicts whatever it wishes, unless prohibited
from doing so elsewhere in the Constitution. The initial due process
inquiry, then, is whether a state may legitimately deny convicts the
right to meaningfully enforce whatever rights they retain. The test
laid down in Turner v. Safley165 controls: "when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
1 66
A threshold question, then, is whether denying prisoners due pro-
cess rights could be "a legitimate penological interest," the answer to
which is most clearly no. "The touchstone of due process is protec-
tion of the individual against arbitrary action of government,"'167 and it
is a central constitutional premise that arbitrary justice is never a le-
gitimate governmental aim. Turner itself requires that penological in-
terests must be "legitimate and neutral,"'6' and not even the most
conservative Justices seem to suggest that altogether denying due
process rights could be constitutionally proper. 69 Rather, all seem to
162 See supra Part III.B.
163 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 n.2 (quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449
(1962)).
164 See supra Part III.B.
165 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (O'ConnorJ.).
166 Id. at 89. Justice Thomas cited the Turner standard approvingly in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 387 n.9 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). The dissenting Justices in Turner were
concerned by how deferentially trial courts would interpret the "reasonable relation"
standard. Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 (Stevens,J., with Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting) ("[T] here is a logical connection between prison discipline and the use of
bullwhips on prisoners.").
167 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Dicta in Wolff make the additional point
that in some cases, denying prisoners "procedures of a free society to the maximum pos-
sible extent" actually comes at the expense of the state's penological interest in rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 563.
168 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
169 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 141-42 (2003) (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (listing as examples of legitimate penological interests "[riestrictions that are ra-
tionally connected to the running of a prison, that are designed to avoid adverse impacts
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agree that prisoners retain due process rights, "subject to restrictions
imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully
committed,""' 70 and the purpose of Mathews is to balance the interests
appropriately.
i. Mathews v. Eldridge
The next question becomes whether due process entails giving
convicts the right to legal research online. Mathews controls.'7' The
breakthrough of Mathews is the insight that in the myriad administra-
tive and judicial situations that give rise to procedures to which indi-
viduals are due, courts always need to keep three factors in mind:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.11
2
Its application in the prison context is straightforward. The first
factor, the private interest of the prisoner in the outcome of the liti-
on guards, inmates, or prison resources, that cannot be replaced by 'ready alternatives,'
and that leave inmates with alternative means of accomplishing what the restrictions pro-
hibit. .. ."). Note that these Justices would fundamentally alter the Turner analysis as tra-
ditionally understood: "Rather than asking in the abstract whether a certain right 'sur-
vives' incarceration, the Court should ask whether a particular prisoner's lawful sentence
took away a right enjoyed by free persons." Id. at 139 (citingJustice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court); see also Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (2006) (Thomas, J., with
Scalia, J., concurring) (reaffirming committment to their Overton concurrence). But it is
highly illuminating that in both Overton and Beard, Justices Thomas and Scalia approved
challenges to prison regulations that carved out special allowances so not to encroach on
the right of access to courts. See Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 1576 (upholding regulation denying
newspapers but allowing religious and legal materials); Overton, 539 U.S. at 126 (uphold-
ing regulation denying visitation by children but allowing visitation by lawyers and
clergy). Thomas and Scalia did not suggest in their concurrences that such allowances
were unnecessary. Ironically, it was Justice Stevens who argued that the allowance in
Beard was dangerous, but he did so concluding that the regulations were futile and should
be overturned. See Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of the
quantity of materials that [Long Term Segregation Unit] inmates are entitled to have in
their cell, it does not follow, as a matter of logic, that preventing inmates from possessing
a single copy of a secular, nonlegal newsletter, or magazine will have any measurable ef-
fect on the likelihood that inmates will start fires, hide contraband, or engage in other
dangerous actions.").
170 Wolff 418 U.S. at 556.
171 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 211 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (applying Mathews to de-
cide procedural due process rights of Ohio inmates challenging placement in state su-
permax facility).
172 Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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gation, clearly weighs towards providing him Internet access. Doing
so stands potentially to allow the wrongfully imprisoned to liberate
themselves through informed habeas petitioning; hence, for pur-
poses of Mathews, inmates are acutely and uniquely interested in be-
ing provided Internet access. Additionally, a prisoner has at least the
same personal interest in defending against a parental rights revoca-
tion, private action against his estate, or any other litigation that
might arise during a prison sentence 73 as anyone else in society would
have, and this fact weighs in favor of ensuring prisoners at least the
same access to legal websites as all citizens enjoy.
The second Mathews factor, the risk of error,7 4 weighs heavily in
favor of providing prisoners with the means to muster an at least in-
telligent defense. Not only does starving prisoners of legal knowl-
edge increase the likelihood of injustices going uncorrected, but as
will be explained, 75 it also increases the likelihood of prisoner-
litigants having the doors to federal courts shut to them in accor-
dance with the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act. Thus, the first two Mathews criteria both demand substan-
tial due process protection for prisoners; and if these were the only
two relevant criteria, the balance of interests might obligate states to
subscribe to sophisticated databases and provide quality counsel in
any action that implicates the rights of a prisoner.
The balance Mathews strikes, however, rests also on a third factor:
the government's important interests in economy, criminal justice,
and maintaining the prison environment. Certainly, the state would
incur substantial expenses outfitting prisons with even rudimentary
Internet access-not only the start-up costs of the hardware and filter-
ing, but also maintenance and operating costs.
The question becomes how to balance these countervailing de-
mands. "The due process clause is not susceptible of reduction to a
mathematical formula,"' 7 6 but Turner v. Safley177 gives courts some very
helpful guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a restric-
tion's relation to a legitimate penological interest.
173 See infra Part III.C.3, Life, Liberty, and Property Interests.
174 Mathews expounds this concept: "the fairness and reliability of the exist-
ing... procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards."
424 U.S. at 343.
175 See infra Part II.D.
176 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949) (Reed, J.).
177 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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ii. Turner v. Safley
Turner proffers four factors for courts to look at to determine the
reasonableness of prison regulations. Quite rightly, the first three de-
fer tremendously to the "informed discretion of corrections offi-
cials" 78 and would (probably) weigh against requiring Internet access
in prisons as long as the prisons already provide adequate law libraries
or legal assistance programs.
[First,] a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection
between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render
the policy arbitrary or irrational....
A second factor ... is whether there are alternative means of exercis-
ing the right that remain open to prison inmates. Where other avenues
remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be
particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to cor-
rections officials.., in gauging the validity of the regulation.
A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the al-
location of prison resources generally....179
Because the state's interest in economy is directly served by not pro-
viding computers and Internet, the first factor is satisfied. In the long
term, of course, digital law libraries will be more economical than
paper, but a court will be bound to defer to a state's stated short-term
economic needs.'80
As long as there are minimally decent alternative means for pris-
oners to do legal research, the second factor is met. It is important to
note, however, that this factor cuts deeply against those prisons that
have curtailed their provision of legal services after Lewis;' 8' in the ab-
sence of alternative mechanisms to give meaning to inmates's due
process rights, this factor would considerably strengthen a claim for Inter-
net access in jail.
178 Id. at9o.
179 Id. at 89-90 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
180 See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) ("Today, as at the
time of the founding, the allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and in-
terests lies at the heart of the political process. While the judgment creditor of a State
may have a legitimate claim for compensation, other important needs and worthwhile
ends compete for access to the public fisc.... If the principle of representative govern-
ment is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be
reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the State,
not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private
citizen.").
181 See supra Part II.C.
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The third factor, later called the "ripple effect"182 on the prison
environment, again evokes the state's interest in prison economy:
any expenditure of funds for computers and Internet access will nec-
essarily divert money that could be used elsewhere. The ramifications
of the program on prison security also weigh in the state's interest
here. Although filters can be designed that make it impossible to visit
non-approved sites, and perhaps special rules could be made for cy-
bercriminals, a court should hesitate to discount the risk of an inmate
hacking the filter for nefarious purposes. On the other hand, there
are reasons to think that computerizing law libraries would produce a
safer prison environment: five computers can be kept in five isolated
rooms, whereas prison libraries are generally open to multiple users
at a time, and have been the site of several high-profile acts of prison
violence.
182
The essential connection to be drawn here is that these three
Turner reasonableness factors govern how courts should weigh the
third Mathews due process factor. The state's interests in economy
and discipline cannot trump the prisoner's interest in due process
absolutely-only insofar as Turner deems the balance reasonable.
Turner's fourth reasonableness factor, on the other hand, works very
much in the prisoner-litigant's favor, and seemingly necessitates that
prisons currently lacking good law libraries be ordered to go digital.
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reason-
ableness of a prison regulation. By the same token, the existence of obvious,
easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but
is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. This is not a "least re-
strictive alternative" test: prison officials do not have to set up and then
shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the
claimant's constitutional complaint. But if an inmate claimant can point to
182 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
183 James Earl Ray, the assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was stabbed twenty-two times
and beaten by members of a Black Muslim group while reading lawbooks in the library at
Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary in 1981. See Suspects Named in Ray Stabbing, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 5, 1981. In 1982, Ronald Simmat, an inmate who contributed a weekly col-
umn to a Connecticut newspaper, was assaulted after upsetting a fellow inmate for typing
too loudly in the library. Samuel G. Freedman, An Inmate Columnist Fights To Halt Trans-
fer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1982, at B1. In 1997, members of the Aryan Brotherhood in Cali-
fornia slipped a bullet under the prison library door to one another for use in retaliation
against an inmate who had assaulted Mafia boss John Gotti, who was paying the Aryan
Brotherhood for protection. Inmate Tells of Gotti Revenge, NEWSDAY, Apr. 15, 2006, at A13.
The same year, rioting inmates set fire to the library of a Virginia prison-another danger
that would be obviated by replacing paper resources with digital. Inmate Is Indicted in War-
den's Stabbing, DAILY PRESS (Va.), Jan. 17, 1997, at C4. See also Chavez v. Perry, 142 F.
App'x. 325 (10th Cir. 2005) (denying Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide se-
curity for a protective custody inmate after two assaults at prison law library).
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an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regula-
tion does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.'s
This final factor implicitly reads into the Constitution a require-
ment that prisons employ new rights-protecting technologies as they
become cheap and readily available. When the Court decided Turner
in 1987, little could it have anticipated the oncoming digital revolu-
tion. Far less could it have anticipated the precipitous decline in the
startup costs of computers, nor the proliferation of quality legal re-
search websites available to all for free. Rather, when the Court laid
down this factor, it had in mind "obvious, easy alternatives" to a Mis-
souri regulation flatly prohibiting inmate marriages without the per-
mission of the prison superintendent that would pose less of a bur-
den on individuals without compromising any security interests.
8
Nevertheless, the conclusion that today this factor requires prisons
to facilitate online legal research by inmates is inescapable. The digi-
tal revolution represents the greatest achievement in the prolifera-
tion of information in human history-it has not only expanded the
information readily available to individuals to a truly infinite degree,
but it has overtaken society at a historically unparalleled rate. When
Lewis came down more than a decade ago, it might well have been
true that Bounds posed a tremendous burden on state resources that
in many cases could not be justified; indeed, the District Court's han-
dling of Lewis exemplified the enormity-verging on lunacy-of this
burden.18 6 But in the time since then, society has witnessed an un-
precedented technological paradigm shift that now enables states not
only to provide prisoners with a boundless reserve of laws and cases,
but to do so for a tiny fraction of the price of even the most rudimen-
tary paper law libraries.
184 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
185 Id. at 98 (pointing to federal regulation that considers "marriage by inmates in federal
prison generally permitted, but not if warden finds that it presents a threat to security or
order of institution, or to public safety").
186
The microscopically detailed order leaves no stone unturned. It covers everything
from training in legal research to the ratio of typewriters to prisoners in each facil-
ity. It dictates the hours of operation for all prison libraries statewide, without re-
gard to inmate use, staffing, or cost.... The order tells [Arizona Department of
Corrections] the types of forms it must use to take and respond to prisoner re-
quests for materials. It requires all librarians to have an advanced degree in library
science, law, or paralegal studies.... The order goes so far as to dictate permissi-
ble noise levels in law library reading rooms and requires the State to "take all
necessary steps, and correct any structural or acoustical problems."
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 390 (1996) (Thomas,J., concurring).
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The due process analysis, therefore, has irreversibly changed. To
the individual inmate, Internet legal resources represent a uniquely
superior tool for the defense of private interests, while to the state,
they represent a uniquely cost-efficient mechanism for honoring its
obligations to prisoners. Filtered Internet access represents the ulti-
mate "obvious, easy alternative []" to paper law libraries, and because
it can "fully accommodate [] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost" to
the state in comparison to paper, it is no longer constitutionally ex-
cusable to deny it.
iii. Taking It One Step Further
One last due process argument remains: that the Internet is not
an acceptable "alternative" to paper law libraries, but is rather so
comprehensive and simple to navigate that it is now the constitution-
ally minimal baseline that states must provide. The first and second
Mathews factors-"the private interest.., and the probable val-
ue... of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"-pull in this
direction, but the ultimate analysis turns on Turner. Two of the
Turner reasonableness factors present arguments that potentially lead
to this conclusion. The second factor examines whether "other ave-
nues"'187 are left open to prisoners to vindicate their rights, and the
fourth asks "if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that
fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests .. .. ",,"s
The needed step is to show that existing prison law libraries are
constitutionally inadequate and that only Internet resources can "ful-
ly" fill the void. As more and more courts begin citing "blawgs""8 9 and
other sources only available online,' 90 this will be an easier and easier
argument to make.
In the meantime, this conclusion can stand on two other grounds.
First is the undeniable fact that the Internet is easier to use than paper
sources. Nearly three-quarters of adults in this country now use the
187 Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
188 Id. at 91 (first emphasis added).
189 For more on Legal Research in the Internet Age, see supra Part I.D.
190 See, e.g., Standley v. Dennison, No. 9:05-CV-1033, 2007 WL 2406909 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
21, 2007) (denying an inmate's claim of due process violations for lack of Internet access
even though cases cited in parole hearing judge's opinion were available only through
LexisNexis and Westlaw).
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Internet, 91 and it is a safe bet that practically all of them would be
more comfortable using it than old-fashioned reporters. The Court
has repeatedly considered arguments "that inmates are 'ill-equipped
to use' 'the tools of the trade of the legal profession,' 192 but the same
can hardly be said about their ability to click the "Criminal Law" links
on the home page of most law-related portals or to use the elemen-
tary search functions of state statutory and decisional law databases.
Such technology is just too good to deny people.
The second possible ground is that the relevant legal knowledge
available to prisoners online dwarfs that which can feasibly be made
available in prison libraries. Bounds was satisfied with North Carolina
providing inmates copies of the North Carolina General Statutes,
North Carolina Reports (dating back less than two decades), North
Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, five volumes of the United States
Code, three Federal Court reporters (dating back less than two dec-
ades), and eight various other books. The Internet, by contrast, pro-
vides thousands of resources, the entire United States Code, and the
statutes and court decisions of every jurisdiction. Not only might sit-
uations arise where these additional resources would be directly valu-
able (for example, when a state initiates custody termination pro-
ceedings against a resident temporarily imprisoned in a different
state), but they might also prove to be just as valuable indirectly (for
analogizing, or as persuasive authority) .193
In short, there are ample grounds for rooting a right to Internet
access in due process. The only obstacle is the Lewis standing re-
quirement. But the grand irony of Lewis is that its elaborate and un-
necessary repudiation of specific language in Bounds actually makes it
easy for a crafty litigant to allege actual prejudice to the pursuit of a
fundamental right.
191 Benderoff, supra note 89, § 3, at 1 (putting figure at 71%); Wired World, SEAYI7LE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 29, 2006, at El (73%).
192 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977). See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355
(1996) (approving ruling of Bounds trial court "that the cost of N.C. Digest and Modern
Federal Practice Digest will surpass the usefulness of these research aids.").
193 It is significant that one of the primary effects of the proliferation of state judicial report-
ers in the United States, see supra Part II.A. on Legal Research in the Early Republic, was
encouraging the exchange of ideas between jurisdictions. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at
243-44.
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3. Life, Liberty, and Property Interests
In addition to imposing a high threshold for showing standing to
sue under Bounds, Justice Scalia also felt compelled to limit the
precedent's scope. In what was technically dicta, 94 he wrote:
It must be acknowledged that several statements in Bounds went be-
yond the right of access recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied,
which was a right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to
present.... These statements appear to suggest that the State must en-
able the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in
court.... To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabili-
ties upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison popu-
lation is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we
do not believe the Constitution requires.195
"Finally," the Court had to add, "we must observe that the injury
requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal
claim., 196 It turns out that " [n] early all" of the precedents that led up
to Bounds were only direct appeals or habeas petitions. 97 Only in one
case, Wolff v. McDonnell,'9s did the Court "extend[] this universe of re-
levant claims [and then] only slightly, to 'civil rights actions'-i.e., ac-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate 'basic constitutional
rights. ' 199
The Court decided that the right of access to courts went no fur-
ther than these precedents. To the extent Bounds had suggested oth-
erwise and forced prisons to facilitate claims other than appeals, ha-
beas corpus, or constitutional rights, it was overruled.
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform them-
selves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from share-
holder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to
be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sen-
tences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions
of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply
one of the incidental (and 0erfectly constitutional) consequences of con-
viction and incarceration.
194 Steinberger, supra note 61, at 417.
195 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (citing Ex parteHull, 312 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1941); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 13-16 (1956);Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489 (1969)).
196 Id.
197 Id. The direct appeals it cited were: Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354 (1963);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253, 258 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 13, 18; Coch-
ran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 256 (1942). The habeas petitions were: Johnson, 393 U.S. at
489; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709-10 (1961); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. at 547-48.
198 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
199 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
200 Id. at 355.
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Justice Souter specifically dissented from the dictum on the
ground that it was not presented by the case before the Court."°' But
there are more fundamental problems with the Court's intimation
than that. For one, it does not necessarily follow from the Wolff deci-
sion. Second, there are consequences of the arguably unconstitutional




What the Court did not recognize was that by curtailing the rights
of prisoners to access information that could assist in vindicating
these arguably fundamental rights, it actually gave more pro se prisoners
standing to defeat the actual holding of Lewis.
i. Wolff v. McDonnell and "Fundamental Constitutional
Rights"
In Lewis, the Court explains its limitation on the scope of Bounds
by pointing to its 1974 decision in Wolff v. McDonnell.2 1 Whereas ear-
lier decisions had only guaranteed prisoners the right to minimally
204
assisted habeas corpus petitions, Wolff extended their entitlement to
assistance with civil rights actions. °  From this, Lewis concludes that
the Constitution only ensures prisoners the meaningful right to liti-
gate state appeals, habeas petitions, and § 1983 actions. Wolff s own
reasoning, however, would quite clearly preclude such a simplifica-
tion:
[W]hile it is true that only in habeas actions may relief be granted which
will shorten the term of confinement, it is more pertinent that both ac-
tions serve to protect basic constitutional rights. The right of access to
the courts... is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allega-
tions concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.
201 Id. at 403-04 (Souter, J., with Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
202 Compare Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding sufficient allega-
tions of injury from claim that "non-existent" access to law library caused prisoner "to lose
custodial credit time that would have shortened his incarceration"), with Shane v. Fauver,
209 F. App'x. 87 (3d Cir. 2006) (denying redress to a prisoner who could link shortcom-
ings in his prison law library to actual injury in a parole board hearing).
203 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
204 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) ("[U]nless and until the State provides some
reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction
relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates
from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.").
205 Wolff 418 U.S. at 579-80.
206 Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
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Now, strictly speaking, it would be logically consistent with this lan-
guage to extend prisoners' right of access to comprehend the very
gamut of "shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims"20 7 that
Lewis sarcastically rejected. Nothing in Wolff precludes the possibility of
further broadening the rights of prisoners under the Due Process
Clause in a later case, and the language in Lewis claiming as much
cannot be justified. More to the point, however, Wolff gives prisoners
the right of assisted access to courts whenever "violations of funda-
mental constitutional rights" are at stake-and habeas petitions and
§ 1983 actions are hardly the only such situations.
Because the Constitution always stands potentially to give prison-
ers at least arguable new rights,08 a commonsensical argument is to
be had that, a priori, it is impossible to know what case or statute will
prove essential to a prisoner's case. Theoretically, any single prece-
dent may prove relevant to the correct interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. But it is unnecessary to make such a stretch, for as Justices
Thomas and Scalia recently made clear, state law often voluntarily
preserves the rights of prisoners to certain fundamental interests;
209
wherever this is the case, the principles in Wolff dictate that by doing
so the state preserves its right to assistance in protecting these inter-
ests.
In other words, the post-Lewis decay of prison law libraries has
ironically given standing to even more convicts to vindicate those
rights that the state chooses not to strip them of. Perhaps when Lewis
was decided, a state could reasonably have decided that while it
207 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
208 Wolff expressly leaves room for liberal arguments for expanding prisoners' property
rights. 418 U.S. at 557-58. Family rights are also a promising avenue. See Turner v. Saf-
ley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (finding "a constitutionally protected marital relationship in
the prison context"); cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (con-
cluding that indigent prisoner's due process rights were not violated by refusal to appoint
attorney in child custody termination hearing, but only after finding that convict had cho-
sen without cause not to contest the termination proceeding and that "the presence of
counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative difference"). Contra Loden
v. Hayes, 208 F. App'x. 356 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying a Bounds claim for a paralegal's assis-
tance in an inmate's divorce); Woods v. Purington, 117 F. App'x. 616 (9th Cir. 2004) (ac-
tion for brother's wrongful death). Of course, a court should always avoid ruling on an
undecided constitutional question unless squarely presented by the case. See generally Gil-
bert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez ?, 10 U.
PA.J. CONST. L. 193 (2008).
209 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 140 (2003) (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., concurring)
("Whether a sentence encompasses the extinction of a constitutional right enjoyed by
free persons turns on state law, for it is a State's prerogative to determine how it will pun-
ish violations of its law, and this Court awards great deference to such determinations.").
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would not directly deny convicts certain liberty or property interests,
in the interest of economy it would deny them the resources to de-
fend them meaningfully. Today, however, the state does not neces-
sarily have to make such a decision; indeed, today, the state necessar-
ily has not to make it, because the Internet renders the dilemma
between economy and due process false. The digital revolution has
left the state the most "obvious, easy alternative []"2 10 to traditional li-
braries conceivable, one that is far easier to use, effectively compre-
hensive, and free.
ii. Standing to Claim a Fundamental Right
"Fundamental" is a purposely vague word. A clever litigant could
make a host of non-frivolous arguments that certain state law rights
are "fundamental." This Part suggests a promising avenue for argu-
ment.
A state-created liberty interest in avoiding harsh prison conditions,
which every prisoner has standing to claim, is fundamental. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting "cruel and un-
usual punishments,' 1 1 but states are of course free to restrict their
brutality further through voluntary legislation. Some of these laws
vest prisoners with "liberty" interests-an ironic concept the Supreme
Court elucidated in 2005 with Wilkinson v. Austin.212
When a prisoner challenges his confinement for violating a state-
created liberty interest in less restrictive conditions, "the touchstone
of the inquiry... is not the language of regulations regarding those
conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves 'in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.' 2 1 In other words, states give
prisoners liberty interests in avoiding restrictions that "impose an
atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context,,
214
and it should be obvious that this interest is fundamental in any mea-
ningful sense of the word.
The question Wilkinson begs with respect to Lewis v. Casey, how-
ever, is how a prisoner can hope to challenge conditions that are
"atypical" without having access to information on what prison condi-
tions are "typical." There are two distinct components of this claim.
210 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,90 (1987).
211 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See generally Symposium, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Litigat-
ing Under the Eighth Amendment, 11 U. PA.J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2009).
212 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (Kennedy,J.).
213 Id. at 223 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
214 Id. at 224.
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A pro se prisoner has standing to obtain the Wilkinson opinion as well
as cases that challenge local prison conditions. This could be done
on the Internet, through DVDs, or with traditional lawbooks, pro-
vided that they have been updated since 2005. But a prisoner should
also have standing to do substantive (in other words, not stricly legal)
research on typical prison conditions, and the most effective and least
expensive way to accommodate this would clearly be through the
Internet.
Thus, upon a simple allegation that denial of Internet access is
impeding an inmate's naked claim that his conditions "impose an
atypical and significant hardship" on him, he can show standing to
defeat Lewis. With a little more thought, surely countless more claims
of "fundamental" rights could be at least non-frivolously con-
ceived 2 1-which by a proper reading of the caselaw is enough to cre-
ate standing.
D. First Amendment Petition Clause 16
In addition to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the
Bill of Rights is read to contain one more provision protecting the
right of access to courts: the First Amendment. Its phrasing even
suggests that the right was presupposed 21 7 in the main body of the
Constitution: "Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right of
the people... to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."218  This right comprehends not only the freedom to lobby
Congress and the Executive, but also the right of access to courts. 9
215 See cases cited supra note 202.
216 The scope of this Comment is the right of access to courts, lodged in the Petition Clause,
but it is well worth noting that banning Internet access in prisons also implicates First
Amendment Speech and Press Clauses. In Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148 (9th
Cir. 2004), a prison regulation that banned inmates from receiving printouts of websites
in the mail was found to violate the First Amendment rights of the prisoners. The Court
found that the Department of Correction's regulation failed to meet the first Turner rea-
sonableness factor "because it did not articulate a rational or logical connection between
its policy" and its putative concern that web pages could have coded messages inserted in
them by the mailer. Id. at 1152. And if the day comes that prisoners are granted filtered
Internet access, there are even grounds for arguing that the speech rights of the Internet
Service Providers themselves are violated by this filtration. See Randolph J. May, Infringing
Free Speech in the Broadband Age: Net Neutrality Mandates, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 178.
217 An idea elaborated on in Part III.E, Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, infra,
218 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
219 See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (-Certainly
the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access
to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.").
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Like other First Amendment rights, however, this right is not abso-
lute. 'Just as false statements are not immunized by the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech, baseless litigation is not
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition., 2 0 Hence, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (enacted before Lewis v. Casey
was decided) created a facially legitimate22' "three strikes" provision
that closes the doors of federal courthouses to prisoners who file
three "frivolous" civil rights actions
Since the passage of the PLRA and the decision in Lewis, however,
the Court decided BE & K Construction,222 where it found a First
Amendment violation in the application of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act to order a corporation to stop pursuing unmeritorious, but
arguable, lawsuits against labor unions. Justice O'Connor's reason-
ing-which was joined by every conservative member of the Court as
then comprised-is worth quoting at length:
First, even though all the lawsuits in this class are unsuccessful, the
class nevertheless includes a substantial proportion of all suits involving
genuine grievances because the genuineness of a grievance does not turn on
whether it succeeds. Indeed, this is reflected by our prior cases which have
protected petitioning whenever it is genuine, not simply when it tri-
1224
umphs. Nor does the text of the First Amendment speak in terms of
successful petitioning-it speaks simply of "the right of the people ... to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
220 Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (citations omitted).
221 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 591-93 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Easterbrook,
J.) (explaining why the PLRA survives equal protection and due process rationality re-
view). For more on the PLRA's fate in light of the equal protection and due process re-
view, see also Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d 790 (lth Cir. 2003),
Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2001), Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687 (8th Cir.
2001), Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000), Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840 (6th
Cir. 2000), Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1999), and Collins v. Algarin, 1998
WL 10234 (E.D. Pa. 1998), affd by an equally divided court sub nom Collins v. Montgomery
City Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 F.3d 679, 686 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), all of which
were cited in Johnson, 339 F.3d at 583.
222 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g) (2000) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivo-
lous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the pris-
oner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.").
223 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) (O'Connor, J., with Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia,J., Kennedy,J., Thomas,J.).
224 Id. at 532 (citing Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
49, 58-61 (1993) ("[P]rotecting suits from antitrust liability whenever they are objectively
or subjectively genuine."); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670
(1965) (shielding from antitrust immunity any "concerted effort to influence public offi-
cials")).
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Second, even unsuccessful but reasonably based suits advance some
First Amendment interests. Like successful suits, unsuccessful suits allow
the "'public airing of disputed facts,"' and raise matters of public con-
cern. They also promote the evolution of the law by supporting the development of
legal theories that may not gain acceptance the first time around. Moreover, the
ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits adds legitimacy to the
court system as a designated alternative to force.225
If the First Amendment protects the right of access to courts in
the contexts of labor and antitrust disputes, then there is no princi-
pled reason to refuse it to pro se prisoners who have been systemati-
cally denied the tools to articulate a sufficient legal complaint. If any-
thing, there is reason to think that the more information about the
legal system and civil rights that prisoners have access to, the better
we all will be, for Bounds made clear that
[a]s this Court has "constantly emphasized," habeas corpus and civil
rights actions are of "fundamental importance ... in our constitutional
scheme" because they directly protect our most valued rights.... [T]he
prisoner petitions here are the first line of defense against constitutional violations.
The need for new legal research or advice to make a meaningful initial
presentation to a trial court in such a case is far greater than is required
to file an adequate petition for discretionary review.
There are two arguments here. The first looks to the policy underly-
ing the First Amendment in concluding that society will be served by
encouraging its prisoners to have every resource available to vindicate
their rights, because doing so will lead to a more open marketplace of
legal ideas and, possibly, to a trickle-up in progressive jurisprudence.
This is most properly an argument to bring to Congress and to state
legislatures, but it is significant that the most conservative justices ap-
peared to be paying it credence in BE & K
225 Id. at 532 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Even though Justice O'Connor decided
the case on narrow statutory textual grounds, it is particularly significant that Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion,joined by Justice Thomas, added that, "in a future appropri-
ate case, we will construe the [NLRA] in the same way we have already construed the
Sherman Act: to prohibit only lawsuits that are both objectively baseless and subjectively
intended to abuse process." Id. at 537 (ScaliaJ., with Thomas,J, concurring).
226 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1977) (emphasis added); see also id. at 826 n.14
("A source of current legal information would be particularly important so that prisoners
could learn whether they have claims at all, as where new court decisions might apply ret-
roactively to invalidate convictions."). Lewis, however, expressly disavowed this footnote.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). Of course, for a non-prisoner to claim standing to
sue from the fact that prisoners are denied Internet access, as the Bounds dicta suggests is
conceivable, would require not only showing actual harm but also the further uphill bat-
tle of causally linking this alleged injury to the prisoner's deprivation of Internet access.
Such a plaintiff would have to show, in other words, not only that being denied the Inter-
net impeded some particular convict's pursuit of a substantial legal claim, but that the re-
sulting gap in jurisprudence negatively affected his own pursuit of a right.
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The second argument is that the First Amendment rights of some
prisoners are actually being violated (or, at least, unconstitutionally
chilled) by the combined effect of Lewis and the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act. Every time a prisoner's subjectively genuine grievance is
dismissed as frivolous, or is discouraged from being filed for fear of
being branded frivolous, he suffers the actual harm of having a
"strike" against his right of access to courts. 22' By definition, there is a
gray area between "frivolous" and "unmeritorious, but arguable in
good faith." Because Lewis denies prisoners the "abstract, freestand-
,,228ing right to a law library or legal assistance, an inevitable conse-
quence is that individual convicts lose the meaningful ability to know'
the difference, and face the Hobson's choice of risking a PLRA
strike 229 or letting the violation pass. Whenever this happens, the First
Amendment is violated-which in and of itself suffices to give the de-
prived prisoner standing to sue under Bounds.
The tragedy of Lewis, of course, is that prisons can use it to deprive
this prisoner of any knowledge that he even has standing. There is
no easy way around this, but when the case arises where a prisoner
risks the strike on his record to challenge this violation of his First
Amendment rights, he will have a real chance to turn Lewis on its
head. In such a case, a conservative court might be more likely to
find the PLRA "three strikes" provision unconstitutionally vague 231 or
void as applied than to order the installation of Internet connections
in prisons. Perhaps in that case, Congress could finally be persuaded
that Internet in prisons can fairly be used to reduce the overall burden
that pro se prisoner litigation places on the federal courts.
227 Joseph L. Gerken, Does Lewis v. Casey Spell the End to Court-Ordered Improvement of Prison
Law Libaries?, 95 LAW LIBR.J. 491, 508-11 (2003).
228 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
229 See, e.g., Sanders v. Klinger, 100 F. App'x. 957 (5th Cir. 2004) (counting second strike for
a frivolous Bounds claim).
230 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning.").
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E. Article IlVPrivileges and Immunities Clause
Compelling arguments have long been made 3 ' that the right of
access to courts is implicit in the very concept of ordered liberty.2  As
Justice Moody, for example, explained, "[t]he right to sue and de-
fend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society
it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the founda-
tion of orderly government., 23 As such, it would follow that the right
is one of the inalienable freedoms of citizens implied in the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and is presupposed (and, hence,
not specifically enumerated) in the Bill of Rights.
Courts have spoken of pro se prisoners' right to legal research in
such flowery terms. 34 A right to state-supplied Internet access in pris-
on, however, was obviously not contemplated in the ratification of Ar-
ticle IV of the Constitution, and it would require a truly profound
generational ignorance to argue that any such entitlement is inherent
in the concept of ordered liberty. At most, the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause can be used to compel the few states that voluntarily of-
fer DVD-based research to ensure that non-resident inmates are pro-
235vided these resources to the same degree as residents.
Instead, the Privileges and Immunities Clause can most compel-
lingly be used to argue morally against the temptation to reduce one
class of citizens' access to courts with further decisions like Lewis. All
one needs to do is point to the Court's infamous Dred Scott decision,
which in no small part was responsible for the Civil War,2 6 and was ul-
231 See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NRLB, 536 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002) ("[T]he right is im-
plied by '[t] he very idea of a government, republican in form.'" (quoting United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403
(1856) (discussing the right of a citizen of the United States to sue in court).
232 The constitutional standard Justice Cardozo first articulated in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
233 Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
234 Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Without this right, all other
rights a prisoner may possess are illusory." (quoting Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241,
1247 (7th Cir. 1983)).
235 Cf Supreme Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) ("We believe that the legal pro-
fession has a noncommercial role and duty that reinforce the view that the practice of law
falls within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."). See generally Chambers,
207 U.S. at 149 ("Different States may have different policies, and the same State may
have different policies at different times. But any policy the State may choose to adopt
must operate in the same way on its own citizens and those of other States.").
236 See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech (June 16, 1858), in MICHAEL F.
HOLT, THE FATE OF THEIR COUNTRY: POLITICIANS, SLAVERY EXTENSION, AND THE COMING
OF THE CIVIL WAR 146-47 (2004) ("Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the
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timately was overruled by Amendment. Chief Justice Taney's now
universally rejected reasoning seems easily applicable to the plight of
convicts today, starved of legal knowledge in the wake of Lewis and
punished for bringing unsophisticated claims under the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act. Deciding whether the descendants of African
slaves are "constituent member[s] of this sovereignty,2 37 his answer
was unapologetic.
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not in-
tended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them. It is not the province of the
court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of
these laws.23s
Hence, the Court concluded, the dominant race of citizens validly
denied the subjugated race the privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship in framing the Constitution-for purposes of the issue in Dred
Scott, the right to access to courts. In light of the Nation's prompt,
righteous, and spectacularly bloody rejection of this logic, it would
hardly be 'judicial activism" to approve the modernization of another
subjugated class's foundational privilege and immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Lewis came down, our Nation has turned a digital corner.
There is no going back: the Internet is easier to navigate, less expen-
sive to use, and more comprehensive and timely than any paper li-
brary could ever be. The paradigm shift has made us all more pro-
ductive contributors to society and has opened our society up in ways
that were still hard to imagine in 1996. The relative superiority of the
course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike
lawful in all the States, old as well as nw---North as well as South.... Let anyone who
doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination-piece of ma-
chiney so to speak-compounded of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott deci-
sion."); William H. Seward, "Irrepressible Conflict" Speech (Oct. 25, 1858), in id. at 154
("Under the protection of the Judiciary, [the slaveholding class] will, on the principle of
the Dred Scott case, carry Slavery into all the Territories of the United States now exist-
ing, and hereafter to be organized.").
237 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
238 Id. at 404-05.
[Vol. 10:4
PRISONER LITIGA TION IN THE hNTERNET AGE
Internet over traditional media is only going to grow more acute with
time, and it no longer stretches the imagination to envision a legal
world where paper resources are gone the way of the abacus. The
Internet Revolution has only left one segment of our society behind:
prisoners, who ironically are those who have the most to gain from
the knowledge freely available thereon.
The Constitution, mercifully, gives us the tools to level the playing
field. Although all three cases to raise the argument have failed, the
Eighth Amendment, Equal Protection, Due Process, the First Amend-
ment, and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause all point in
the same direction: towards opening the portals of legal research to
those we lock behind bars. In so doing, we can save public money,
provide an extra layer of procedural fairness to the criminal justice
system, and give inmates the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves
through computer literacy and the betterment that inherently flows
when one learns law. In not so doing, we squander resources, make a
mockery of justice, and abandon hope for the class of society most in
need of our guidance and benevolence.
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